This article has two parts. In Part I, we briefly outline the analysis of 'contrary-to-duty' obligation sentences presented in our 2002 handbook chapter 'Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties', with a focus on the intuitions that motivated the basic formal-logical moves we made. We also explain that the present account of the theory differs in two significant respects from the earlier version, one terminological, the other concerning the way the constituent modalities interconnect. Part II is the principal contribution of this article, in which we show that it is possible to define a complete and decidable axiomatization for the Carmo and Jones logic, a problem that was still open. The axiomatization includes two new inference rules; we illustrate their use in proofs, and show that on the basis of this axiomatization we can recover all the axioms and rules considered in 'Deontic logic and contrary-to-duties', and used there in the analysis of contrary-to-duty conditional scenarios.
Part I
Part I of this article rehearses in outline the principal considerations that motivate the analysis of 'contrary-to-duty' obligation sentences (CTDs) presented in [1] . In the course of this outline, we also indicate that there are two significant differences between the [1] version of the theory and the one presented here. The first difference is terminological: what we earlier called 'ideal obligations' will now be referred to as 'primary obligations'. The second difference pertains to the way in which primary and actual obligations are conceptually connected: we here adopt a logical principle that was discussed in [1] , but to which we did not there commit.
The 'dog and warning sign' example (D&WS), due to [9, 10] provides a suitable point of departure. (The example is a variant of the Chisholm set [3] , which initiated the discussion of CTDs in deontic logic.) (D&WS) (a) There ought to be no dog. (b) If there is no dog, there ought to be no warning sign. (c) If there is a dog, there ought to be a warning sign. (d) There is a dog.
Any attempt to give an appropriate formal-logical analysis of sets of this kind must be able to give an answer to the questions: what is the actual obligation, in the circumstances described, of the agent X. Accordingly, we say that a sentence O(B/A) is true in a model if and only if, in any context X where A is true and B is possible (i.e. in any context having A true in each of its worlds and B true in at least one of its worlds), it is obligatory that B. 2 On the basis of this operator we could now derive the obligations that were applicable in each context. The question is what are the types of contexts that we need to be able to talk about in our formal language, taking into account the obligations we want to derive. Our answer is that we want to be able to talk about the context of what is actually considered open to the agent (formed by the worlds we call the actual versions of the current world) and about the context of what was potentially possible/open to the agent (formed by the worlds we call the potential versions of the current world). The propositions that are obligatory in the former context we call actual obligations and we reserve the term primary obligations for the propostions that are obligatory in the latter context. And we use the two above-mentioned necessity operators (and their duals) to express in our formal language what is true or not true in these contexts.
So, depending on the modal status of line (d) , above, as expressed in terms of our two pairs of notions of necessity and possibility, the logical theory licensed the inference of particular conclusions concerning primary and actual obligations. 3 Primary obligations, we may say, represent what should have been done in a given situation. Accordingly, we express violation of obligation in terms of primary obligation. We may now outline, in summary, our analysis of the (D&WS) scenario: if it is a fixed fact that (actually necessary that) there is a dog (i.e. if 2 a dog is true), but it is actually possible that a sign may be erected and potentially possible that there is no dog, then the [1] logic licenses the derivation of the actual obligation to erect a warning sign (O a sign) and the primary obligation that there is no dog (O p ¬dog). There is no actual obligation that there be no dog precisely because we are supposing that removal of the dog is not an actual possibility. But a violation has nevertheless occurred, as expressed by the conjunction O p ¬dog ∧ dog. 4 Those, in brief outline, are the basic principles of our approach. For a detailed discussion of their application to a broad spectrum of CTD scenarios, including those in which more than two levels of obligations are involved, we refer the reader to [1] , especially pp. 298-314.
What remains to be mentioned is the second issue with respect to which the present article differs from [1] . At p. 319 of the latter we raised the question of how the relationship between actual obligation and (what we now call) primary obligation is to be characterized. Suppose it to be the case that there is a primary obligation that A, and that it is still actually possible to fulfill that obligation and still actually possible to violate it. That is, suppose:
Should it not then follow that it is actually obligatory that A ? In [1] we discussed this issue, but left it unresolved. We now decide in favour of an affirmative answer to the question; the formal ramifications of that decision are described in Part II. But we conclude this section by noting that the inclusion of O p A ∧ ♦ a A ∧ ♦ a ¬A → O a A as a valid sentence of the logic provides, we think, good reason for not calling 'actual' obligations 'secondary' obligations.
Part II
Part II is the technical part of the article, in which we show that is possible to define a complete and decidable axiomatization for the logic proposed in [1] , a problem that was still open. 5 In Section 1, we describe the formal language and in Section 2 we describe the semantics. In Section 3, we describe the proposed axiomatization and show that it is sound and consistent. The given axiomatization includes two inference rules of a new kind, and in Section 4 we illustrate the use of these inference rules in proofs and show that within this axiomatization we can recover (prove) all the axioms and rules considered in [1] , and used there in the analysis of the CTD scenarios. Section 5 is devoted to proving that the proposed axiomatization is complete and satisfies the finite model property. We omit many of the proofs, or make only a sketch of them. For the details, the reader is referred to the Appendix A.
Section 1. Formal language
The alphabet of our formal language consists of:
• An infinite countable set of propositional symbols Instead of ¬, ∧, ∨, →, ↔, we could consider as primitive only ¬ and ∧, or any other adequate set of propositional connectives. The 'in all worlds' necessity operator 2 was not considered in [1] . 6 With it we can define an axiomatization that expresses better the underlying semantic intuitions, 5 As mentioned in [1] (p. 296, footnote 21), at that time we already had some unpublished completeness results. They concerned the 2+O(/) fragment of our logic (i.e. without considering 2 a , 2 p , O a and O p ). Specifically, we proved that schemas 1-8 of Section 3 provide a complete and decidable axiomatization for that 2+O(/) fragment (regarding models of the form M=<W,ob,V>). However, the definition of a complete and decidable axiomatization for the whole logic was an open issue. The adaptation of Cresswell's mini-canonical model (using the terminology of one of the reviewers) is here non-trivial and much more complex than for the 2+O(/) fragment (in particular, for this fragment the formula ϕ used for building the 'canonical model', in Section 5, could be simply the initial consistent formula ψ). We also want to mention that, recently (after the writing of the original version of this article), we discovered that [6] provided a preferential semantics for our system, and proved an axiomatization of a modification of it to be complete with respect to ranked structures. 6 In fact, as we have already mentioned, in [1] the box 2 was used, but to represent the in all potential versions operator allowing us to clarify what has to do with all worlds, what has to do with the potential versions of the current world and what has to do with the actual versions of the current world. The consideration of 2 also facilitates the construction of a complete axiomatization.
The rules for construction of well-formed sentences (formulae) are as usual. In writing formulas, we may omit parentheses assuming the following precedence between the operators: 1st) the unary operators; 2nd) ∧; 3rd) ∨; 4th) → and ↔. We will use (the first Latin capital letters) A, A 1 , …, B, B 1 , … to generically refer to sentences (formulas), , 1 ,…, , … to denote sets of sentences and q, q 1 , … to refer to atomic sentences (propositional symbols).
The duals of 2, 2 p and 2 a are denoted, respectively, by ♦, ♦ p and ♦ a , and defined as usual:
We consider T = df q→q, for some propositional symbol q, and ⊥= df ¬T. Sequences of conjunctions and disjunctions are defined as usual (and A 1 ∧… ∧A n = df T, if n = 0, and A 1 ∨ … ∨A n = df ⊥, if n = 0). We consider also conjunctions and disjunctions of finite sets of formulae, defined as expected (for n ≥ 0):
In the metalanguage, we also use the usual quantifiers.
Section 2. Semantics
Our models are structures M=<W,av, pv, ob, V>, where:
(1) W is a non-empty set. (2) V is a function assigning a truth set to each atomic sentence (i.e. V(q) ⊆ W). (3) 'av' is a function (where ℘(W) denotes the power set of W) av : W → ℘(W) such that (where w denotes an arbitrary element of W):
and ob : ℘(W) → ℘(℘(W)) is such that (where X,Y, Z designate arbitrary subsets of W) 7 :
(5a) ∅ / ∈ ob(X) (5b) if Y∩ X = Z ∩ X, then (Y ∈ ob(X) iff Z ∈ ob(X)) (5c * ) Let β ⊆ ob(X) and β =∅, i.e. let β be a non-empty set of elements of ob(X).
If (∩β) ∩ X =∅ (where ∩β = {w∈W: ∀ Z∈β w∈Z}) then (∩β) ∈ ob(X) (5d) if Y⊆X and Y∈ob(X) and X⊆Z, then ((Z-X) ∪ Y) ∈ ob(Z) (5e) if Y⊆X and Z∈ob(X) and Y∩Z =∅, then Z∈ob(Y) Given a model M=<W, … >, the elements of W are designated by worlds and (as above) in what follows we will use w, v, … to denote arbitrary worlds and X,Y, Z to denote arbitrary sets of worlds. Intuitively: av(w) denotes the set of actual versions of the world w; pv(w) denotes the set of potential versions of the world w; and ob(X) denotes the set of propositions which are obligatory in context X.
We write M |= w A to denote that formula A is true in the world w of a model M=<W, av, pv, ob, V>, and we define ||A|| M = {w∈W: M|= w A}. In order to simplify the presentation, whenever the model M is obvious from the context, we write ||A|| instead of ||A|| M .
Truth in a world w in a model M=<W, av, pv, ob, V> is characterized as follows: M |= w p iff w ∈ V(p) … (the usual truth conditions for the connectives ¬, ∧, ∨, → and ↔)
iff ||A|| ∈ ob(pv(w)) and pv(w) ∩ ||¬A|| = ∅ A sentence A is said to be true in a model M=<W, av, pv, ob, V>, written M |= A, iff ||A|| M = W; and A is said to be valid, written |=A, iff M |=A in all models M.
Observation II-2-1 (1 
And, taking into account (5a), we can deduce that our models also satisfy the following condition:
(a condition which in turn implies (5a)) (4) If W is finite, then (5c*) (which means (5c) generalized) is equivalent to the following condition 9 :
(5c) if Y, Z ∈ ob(X) and Y∩Z∩X = ∅, then Y∩Z ∈ ob(X) which means that the conjunction of obligatory propositions (in some context X) is also obligatory, unless we are in the presence of contraditory obligations (within that context). (5) Condition (5d) states that if a subset Y of X is an obligatory proposition in a context X, then in a bigger context Z it is obligatory to be either in Y or else in that part of Z which is not in X. The first lemma (below), which can be used to simplify some proofs, states a 'generalization' of condition (5d) (implied by (5d), assuming, as we do, condition (5b)). (6) Condition (5e) states that if Z is an obligatory proposition in a context X, then Z is also obligatory in any subcontext Y of Z where it is possible to fulfill Z. Condition (5e) was discussed in [1] , where its adoption was left open. Here we assume it. (7) It is obvious that M|= w O(B/A) implies ||B|| ∈ ob(||A||). As stated below (result II-2-2), the inverse is also true, assuming condition (5e). Thus, besides some other good consequences, the adoption of (5e) allows us to simplify the definition of M |= w O(B/A).
Lemma II-2-1 Assuming condition (5b), the following condition below is equivalent to (5d):
Result II-2-1 Let M 1 and M 2 be two models that differ at most in the valuation of the propositional symbols, i.e. M 1 =<W, av, pv, ob, V 1 > and M 2 =<W, av, pv, ob, V 2 >. If V 1 (q) = V 2 (q), for any propositional symbol q occurring in A, then
Adopting, as we are doing, condition (5e) (besides condition (5ab)), then:
With condition (5c*) (plus conditions (5a), (5b) and (5d)), we obtain: ob-∪*) Let β be a non-empty set of subsets of W, and let H = ∪β (= {w∈W:
Let β be a non-empty set of subsets of W, H = ∪β and suppose that ∀ Z∈β X∈ob(Z). Let β'= {(H-Z)∪X: Z∈ β}.We have that ∩β' = (∩{H-Z: Z∈ β}) ∪ X = ∅ ∪ X = X We can also prove that: β' is non-empty, β' ⊆ ob(H) and (∩β')∩H =∅. Thus, by condition (5c*),(∩β') ∈ ob(H), i.e. X ∈ ob(H) (as we wish to prove).
Section 3. Axiomatization 2.3.1 Axioms and inference rules
In what follows we introduce the axioms and rules for the modal operators. For some of the axioms and theorems, we introduce special labels-if there is no standard label-in order to facilitate reference to them. We assume as axioms all tautologies and we assume the Modus Ponens (MP) inference rule. And we will use PC (from Propositional Calculus) as reference for the use of any tautology or any tautological rule (both the primitive Modus Ponens and the other derivable tautological inference rules).
Characterization of 2:
( 1) 2 is a normal modal operator of type S5 (using Chellas classification, see [2] ) Characterization of O:
Reference label (2) O
the principle of strengthening of the antecedent:
the 'RE-axiom' wrt the antecedent:
the 'contextual RE-axiom' wrt the consequent:
Characterization of 2 p : (9) 2 p is a normal modal operator of type KT (using Chellas classification) Characterization of 2 a : (10) 2 a is a normal modal operator of type KD (using Chellas classification) Relationships between 2, 2 p and 2 a :
Relationships between O a (respectively: O p ) and 2 a (resp.: 2 p ):
Relationships between O, O a (resp.: O p ) and 2 a (resp.:
Finally, in order to get a complete axiomatization for the whole logic, we introduce two primitive inference rules, of a new type, which we refer as rules to consistently add O(/) formulas. This name comes from the use given to these rules in the completeness proof. Briefly, these rules are used there to construct the maximal consistent sets, that will be our 'canonical worlds', in such a way that whenever a relevant O a A belongs to one of those worlds, we can also add to that world a formula 2 a q∧O(A/q) for an appropriate propositional symbol q (and similarly, if O p A belongs, we can add 2 p q∧O(A/q) for an appropriate q).
(16) Rules to consistently add O(/) formulas:
If the propositional symbol q does not occur in any of the formulas B 1 , … , B n , A and
If the propositional symbol q does not occur in any of the formulae B 1 , … , B n , A and
Soundness and consistency
Lemma II-3-1 From conditions (5b) and (5d) (of our models), it follows that: if M |= w O(B/A) and Z is such that Z ∩ ||A||∩ ||B|| =∅, then ||A→B|| ∈ ob(Z)
Proof of (a) (the proof of b) is similar). Suppose that the propositional symbol q does not occur in any of the formulae B 1 , … , B n , A and that
and suppose, by reductio ad absurdum, that
Then, there exists some model M = <W, av, pv, ob, V> and some world w ∈ W such that (2) M |= w B 1 ∧ … ∧B n and M |= w ♦O a A, a condition that implies that there exists a world v ∈ W such that
Let M 1 be the model M 1 =<W, av, pv, ob, V 1 > with V 1 defined as follows: if q 1 =q then V 1 (q 1 )=V(q 1 ), and V 1 (q) = ∪ x∈X av(x) Since q does not occur in any of the formulae B 1 , … , B n , A, by result II-2-1, we have that
And, from (2) and (4) it follows that (5) M 1 |= w B 1 ∧ … ∧B n . Let β = {av(y): y∈X}. We have that:
(As a matter of fact, if Z∈ β, then there exists y∈X such that Z = av(y), and y∈X=||O a A|| M1 implies M 1 |= y O a A, which implies that ||A|| M1 ∈ ob(av(y)).)
Thus, from condition ob-∪*) (see lemma II-2-2), we conclude that (6) ||A|| M1 ∈ ob(||q|| M1 ).
The complicated part of the soundness proof was established in result II-3-1, and proved above.
With respect to the rest of the soundness proof, which we have omitted above (and included in the Appendix A), we make next only some brief comments.
The validity of many of the axioms follows (more or less directly) from the relevant truth conditions. The semantic condition (5c*) is needed only to prove result II-3-1. For the rest of the soundness proof, it suffices to consider condition (5c) (which is used to prove the validity of schema 3 (O-C)).
Lemma II-3-1 is useful to prove the validity of schema 8 (O→O→).
In the soundness proof, the semantic condition (5e) is needed to prove both the result II-3-1 and the validity of schema 8 (O→O→).
Result II-3-3 The proposed axiomatization is consistent, i.e.
12 ⊥ is not a theorem.
Proof. By result II-3-2, it suffices to prove that there is (at least) a model for our logic. Let M=<W, av, pv, ob, V> be defined as follows:
(1) W is any non empty set; (2) V is any total function from the set of propositional symbols into ℘(W); (3) av : W → ℘(W) is defined as follows: ∀ w∈W av(w) = W; (4) pv : W → ℘(W) is defined as follows: ∀ w∈W pv(w) = W; and (5) ob :
It is easy to see that M, so defined, satisfies all conditions of the models of our logic.
Section 4. Some theorems and derived (proof) rules
In this section we show that we can recover (prove) all the axioms and rules considered in [1] , and used there in the analysis of the CTD scenarios, and we illustrate the use of the new inference rules in proofs. The axiomatization proposed here differs from the one considered in [1] in three principal ways. First, we have included here, in our formal language, the 'in all worlds' necessity operator, which has permitted a 'reformulation' of some of the axioms and rules in [1] . The list of these axioms and rules can be seen in result II-4-1 below, where it is stated that they can still be deduced.
Second, we have assumed here semantic condition (5e), whose adoption was left open in [1] . Without (5e), schema (O→O→) is not valid and should be replaced, in our axioms, by the schemas
(O→O p →) (schemas that can be deduced from (O→O→): see observation II-4-2 below).
Finally, we have extended semantic condition (5c) (referred to as (5c _ ) in [1, p. 323] ) to condition (5c*), an extension that seems uncontroversial and that, together with the adoption of condition (5e), has allowed us to 'validate' the two new primitive rules, which are the main innovation of this axiomatization as compared with the one in [1] . These rules are essential to our completeness proof, as will be clear in the next section. In this section, we illustrate the use of these rules in proofs, showing, in particular, that they allow us to deduce, as theorems, the following schemas
(O p -C) which are valid assuming condition (5c), and were assumed as axioms in [1] , as well as
The latter is an important schema, relating primary and actual obligations; it is valid assuming (5e) (and would be assumed as an axiom, if we were to adopt (5e) and if we did not adopt the new primitive rules).
Lemma II-4-1 Let C[A/B] denote a formula that we can obtain by replacing in formula C one or more occurrences of formula A by formula B. Then:
Proof. The proof is standard and uses (besides PC) the fact that 2 is an S5-operator and axioms (↔O a ) and (↔O p ).
Observation II-4-1 (a) By 2-necessitation and PC, from the (REQ)-theorem, above, it follows trivially the following rule of replacement of equivalents (where the notation C[A/B] means the same as in the previous lemma)
If Thus, the following theorem follows:
And from this theorem, the normality of 2 and PC, the following theorem also follows: |−♦¬O(B/A) → 2¬O(B/A) label: (♦¬O→ 2¬O) As discussed in [1] , p. 294, axiom (O→ 2O) and these theorems reflect the fact that norms which comprise the deontic component of a CTD scenario are themselves taken to be fixed. This is a reasonable assumption to make, given that our concern is not with the dynamics of normative systems, but with the determination of which primary and actual obligations may be derived from a fixed set of norms, given the facts of the case.
Result II-4-1 (a) The following schemas (which are axioms in [1] ) can be deduced as theorems:
The following rules (which are primitive in [1] ) can be derived:
Observation II-4-2 That (O→O a →) can be deduced from (O→O→) (and other axioms), can be seen as follows:
using PC and known properties of normal operators
from (3) and (4) 
from (1), (2) and (5) 
Proof of (a) (the proof of (b) is similar). Suppose that the propositional symbol q does not occur in any of the formulae B 1 , … , B n , A and that
Proof. (a) Let A be any formula and suppose that q is any propositional symbol that does not occur in A.
(
from (2) and (3) • We will start by proving that
The detailed proof is as follows:
using properties of normal operators and PC
from (3), (4), (5) and (2) by PC analogously we get
using properties of normal operators
from (¬O a ) and PC using the properies of 2 a (is a normal operator) (12) |− ♦ a ¬A → ♦ a ¬(A∧B) using PC and the properies of 2 a (is a normal operator) (11), (12), (9), (7), (6), (3), (4), (8) and (10) 
by the (→¬O a )-rule (see lemma II-4-2: note that r does not appear in any formula in the antecedent of (14)
from (15) by PC
• And using this last theorem we can prove that
The proof of (c) is similar to the proof of (b) .
Observation II-4-3 As can be seen by the examples analysed in [1] 
label: (O p -DD) (In Appendix A we prove that (Oa-DD) can be deduced from axiom (↔O a ) and theorems (O a -C) and (O→O a →), using the normality of 2 a , and PC. And analogously for Op.)
Besides these theorems, extensive use is also made of the T-normality of 2 p , the D-normality of 2 a , and of axiom (2 p → 2 a ) (and of the theorem |− ♦ a A → ♦ p A which follows from it).
Section 5. Completeness (and decidability)
In this section, we will show that any consistent formula has a finite model where it is satisfiable. In this way, we show that our axiomatization is complete and has the finite model property, and so our logic is also decidable.
We start by stating and fixing some general notations and conventions that will be used in the rest of this article, and we state some preliminary results related with maximal consistent sets. We will use the standard results for normal modal operators, without giving proofs. The notions of consistency and maximal consistency are assumed herein to be known and defined as in e.g. the book [7] .
General assumptions and notations
We will reserve ψ to denote the formula (assumed to be consistent) whose satisfiability we wish to show (i.e. we want to demonstrate that it is true in some world of some model).
From this initial (fixed, although arbitrary) consistent formula ψ, we will build another formula, to be denoted by ϕ, that is also consistent (assuming that ψ is consistent), and whose truth in a world (of a model) implies the truth of ψ in the same world. And we build a finite model where ϕ is true in some world. The way we build ϕ from ψ will be described later.
We assume a fixed enumeration (without repetitions) of all the formulae, and when we say that B 1 , B 2 , … , B n constitutes an enumeration of a set of formulae , we assume that B 1 , B 2 , … , B n is the enumeration (without repetitions) of the formulae in obtained according to the fixed enumeration of all the formulae.
Subf (A) denotes the set of all the subformulae of A, and it is defined as usual. (Thus, A is a subformula of A). And Subf( ) =∪ A∈ Subf(A).
The boolean closure of a set of formulae , will be denoted by bc( ) and it is defined, inductively, as expected, i.e. bc( ) is the smallest set of formulae such that:
If the set is closed under subformulae, then bc( ) is also closed under subformulae. (However, bc( ) is not finite, even if is finite.)
We use * to denote the Lindenbaum extension of . (We write A* instead of {A}*). * can be defined (e.g. as in [7] ) as follows: assuming that B 1 , B 2 , … is the enumeration of all formulae, then * is the union of all the n 's (n 0), with:
Since we are assuming a fixed enumeration of the formulae, * is uniquely determined. As is well known, if is consistent, * is maximal consistent.
Notation II-5-1 (i) We use to denote set of all the subformulae of ϕ, i.e. = Subf(ϕ).
(ii) We use a 1 ,…, a n to denote the subformulae of ϕ, i.e. more precisely, we assume that a 1 ,…, a n (where n = # > 0) constitutes an enumeration of . (iii) We write ' is a mc' or, simply, ' mc' to mean that is a maximal consistent set of sentences.
Informally, we say that a formula A is a Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ, if A∈bc( ). We will assume that T is an abbreviation of q→q, for some propositional symbol q occurring in the formula ϕ (and, as already mentioned, ⊥ is an abbreviation of ¬T). Thus, T and ⊥ are Boolean combinations of subformulae of ϕ (i.e. T,⊥∈bc( )).
The notion of descriptor
We now define the notion of descriptor according to = Subf(ϕ),
The set DESCRIPTORS, of all descriptors according to = Subf(ϕ), is defined as follows 13 : DESCRIPTORS = {A 1 ∧ … ∧A n : for i = 1, … ,n, A i is either a i Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ, and follows from the properties of the mc sets.
Lemma II-5-2 If is mc and ♦A∈ (where A is any formula), there is (at least) one descriptor d such that ♦(d∧A)∈ Outline of the Proof. The desired descriptor d = A 1 ∧ … ∧A n , can be inductively built as follows
Lemma II-5-3 Let be mc, d a descriptor and A a Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ, i.e. A∈bc( ). Then if ♦(d∧A)∈ then 2(d→A)∈
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of the Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ, and uses the properties of the mc sets and the fact that 2 is a normal modal operator.
The set of worlds W(ϕ)
Later we will describe how we build our formula ϕ from our initial consistent formula ψ, Until then, in what follows it is only assumed that ϕ is a consistent formula. In what follows we write simply W, instead of W(ϕ), assuming ϕ implicit.
Proof.
(a) Standard (using the fact that 2 is a normal operator). (b) Obvious, since the set DESCRIPTORS is finite.
Notation II-5-3 |A| = {w∈W: A∈w}.
Some results that depend only on the properties of the operator 2 (and of the mc sets)
Lemma II-5-4 (Where A and B can be any formulae:) Result II-5-2 There exists (at least) a w∈W such that ϕ ∈w.
Proof. Since |−ϕ →♦ϕ, and ϕ ∈ ϕ*, we conclude that ♦ϕ ∈ ϕ*. And the result follows from .
We have defined d( ), for a mc set. Since each world w is a mc set, this allow us to talk about d(w). Now we extend the notation to (finite) sets of worlds.
Notation II-5-4 For X⊆W (which implies that X is finite), we define d(X) = ∨{d(w): w∈X} ( =∨ w∈X d(w) ) Note that d(X) is a Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ, i.e. d(X)∈bc( ).
Lemma II-5-6 (a) (Where A and B can be any formulae:) Lemma II-5-8 Let B∈bc( ) (i.e. B is a Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ) and let A be any formula. (a-ii) and (b-ii) follow from, respectively, (a-i) and (b-i) , by lemma II-5-7.
2.5.6 The construction of the relevant formula ϕ from the initial consistent formula ψ
Let ψ denote a (any) consistent sentence (which will be assumed fixed from now on).
• We are now going to build a sequence of sets of formulae 0 , 1 ,…as follows: Let q p 1 ,…,q a 1 ,…be a sequence of distinct propositional symbols not occurring in the formula ψ.
(The number of q p j s that are needed is equal to or less than the number of subformulae of ψ of the form O p A; likewise the number of q a j s that are needed is equal to or less than the number of subformulae of ψ of the form O a A.) 14 Let O a A 1 , O a A 2 ,…,O a A r (r 0) be the enumeration of the subformulae of ψ of the form O a A. For j = 1,…,r:
Note that is finite.
• Let ϕ =∧ .
The rest of the notations are as before. In particular, =Subf(ϕ) and bc( ) is the boolean closure of . Note that is finite and contains all the subformulae of the initial formula ψ (since ψ belongs to ).
Observation II-5-1
(1) Since q p 1 ,…,q p k ,…,q a 1 ,…,q ar do not occur in ψ, it follows that: Thus, since the propositional symbols q p 1 ,…,q p k ,…,q a 1 ,…,q ar are all distinct, it is easy to see that, in the construction above:
-each q p j (with j = 1,…,k) does not occur in any of the formulae in j−1 ;
14 There is no specific reason to work with the primary obligations before the actual obligations. (We could have done it the other way around).
by guest on January 28, 2013 http://logcom.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from (2) It is also easy to see that if a formula of the form O p A belongs to =Subf(ϕ) (or to bc( ), since a formula of the form O p A belongs to bc( ) iff it belongs to ), then O p A belongs to Subf(ψ). Analogously, if a formula of the form O a A belongs to (or to bc( )), then it belongs to Subf(ψ).
Proof of (a) (the proof of (b) is similar). Suppose that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are verified and suppose, by reductio ad absurdum, that But this contradicts the consistency of (since B 1 ,…,B n , ♦O a A ∈ ).
Result II-5-4 (a) The set is consistent. (b) The formula ϕ is consistent.
(a) We prove below (by simple induction) that each set of formulae 0 , 1 ,…, k+r (= ) is consistent.
(i) By hypothesis, 0 = {ψ} is consistent.
(ii) Consider any j = 1,…,k, and suppose that j−1 is consistent. Then Either j−1 ∪{♦O p A j } is inconsistent, and (as is known) j = j−1 ∪{¬♦O p A j } is consistent; or j−1 ∪{♦O p A j } is consistent, and the consistency of v ∈ av(w) iff ∀ A∈bc( ) (if 2 a A∈w then A∈v) -pv : W → ℘(W), is defined as follows:
In M(ϕ) =<W(ϕ), av, pv, ob, V> above, in the definition of av and pv we cannot replace the set bc( ) by the smaller set (otherwise we cannot make one of the steps in the proof of result II-5-6 below), neither can we replace bc( ) by the bigger set of all formulas (otherwise we are not able to do the proof of (a) and (b) of next lemma).
Notation II- In what follows, we assume ϕ implicit, and write (simply): Result II-5-5 M (defined as in Definition II-5-3) satisfies all the conditions of our models.
Outline of the Proof.
• That W =∅ is a particular consequence of result II-5-2.
• (proof of) condition (3a): use the D-axiom for 2 a and lemma II-5-9-e).
• condition (4a): use axiom (2 p → 2 a ).
• condition (4b): use the T-axiom for 2 p .
• condition (5a): use |− ¬O(⊥/d(X)) (see result II-4-1-a).
• condition (5b): use lemmas II-5-6 and II-5-5 and axiom (O-CONT-REC).
• condition (5c*): since W is finite, M satisfies condition (5c*) iff M satisfies condition (5c). To prove (5c), use lemmas , and theorem (REQ) (lemma II-4-1).
• condition (5d): assuming condition (5b), by lemma II-2-1, (5d) is equivalent to the condition (5bd) if Y∈ob(X) and X⊆Z, then ((Z-X) ∪ Y) ∈ ob(Z) And, assuming (5b), since ((Z-X) ∪ Y) ∩ Z = ((W-X) ∪ Y) ∩ Z, condition (5bd) is equivalent to if Y∈ob(X) and X⊆Z, then ((W-X) ∪ Y) ∈ ob(Z)) Thus, since we have proved that M satisfies condition (5b), we only need to prove that M satisfies the previous simpler condition. For that, , , , and , axioms (O→♦), (O→O→) and (O-SA), and theorem (REQ) (lemma II-4-1).
• condition (5e): use lemmas II- [5] [6] and and axiom (O-SA). Suppose O a B∈Subf(ϕ) which implies that B∈Subf(ϕ), and let w be any world.
• Suppose O a B∈ w. We want to prove that M |= w O a B, i.e. ||B|| ∈ob(av(w)) and av(w)∩||¬B|| =∅. By o(B) (since B∈Subf(ϕ)), ||B|| = |B|. Thus we need to prove that (*) |B|∈ ob(av(w)) and (**) av(w)∩|¬B| =∅. From axiom (¬O a ), we derive that |-O a B→¬2 a B. Thus ¬2 a B∈ w and, by lemma , there exists v∈W such that v∈av(w) and ¬B∈v. Thus, we have (**) av(w)∩|¬B| =∅. Let us now prove (*) |B|∈ ob(X), with X = av(w). We have that O a B∈Subf(ϕ) implies that O a B∈Subf(ψ). Suppose, then, that O a / q a j ) ) ∈ , and so also, successively:
(since O a A j = O a B ∈ w) 2 a q a j ∈ w and O(B/q a j ) ∈ w (since B = A j ) And, since q aj is a subformula of ϕ, from 2 a q a j ∈w, it follows that q a j ∈v for every v∈av(w). Thus X=av(w) ⊆|q a j |. But |d(X)| = X (lemma II-5-6-(b)-(iii)) and d(X) and q a j are Boolean combinations of subformulae of ϕ. Thus, by lemma II-5-5-(b), 2(d(X)→q a j ) ∈ ϕ*, and so (by lemma II-5-
On the other hand, from axiom (¬O a ), it follows that |-2 a ¬B→¬O a ¬¬B. Thus, since O a B∈ w, we have ¬2 a ¬B=♦ a B∈w. And, by lemma II-5-9-(c), Corollary II-5-3 If ψ is consistent, there is a finite model M=<W,av,pv,ob,V> and a world w∈W such that M|= w ψ.
Proof. By results II-5-5 and II-5-6, there is a finite model M=<W,av,pv,ob,V> such that
Proof. Let β be a non-empty set of subsets of W, H = ∪β and suppose that ∀ Z∈β X∈ob(Z). Let β'= {(H-Z)∪X: Z∈ β}.
(i) Since β is non-empty, β' is non-empty, (ii) Let Z∈ β. By condition (5bd), since X∈ob(Z) and Z⊆H, we conclude that ((H-Z)∪X)∈ob(H) Thus β' ⊆ ob(H) (iii) We have that ∩β' = ∩{(H-Z)∪X: Z∈ β} = (∩{H-Z: Z∈ β}) ∪ X = 18 ∅ ∪ X = X (iv) On the other hand, since β is non-empty, there exists some Y∈ β, and by condition (5ab), since X∈ob(Y), we have that X∩Y =∅. Thus X∩H =∅. That is, (∩β')∩H =∅.
Thus, from (i)- (ii) and (iv) , by condition (5c*), it follows that (∩β') ∈ ob(H), i.e. (by iii) X ∈ ob(H).
Lemma II-3-1 From conditions (5b) and (5d) , it follows that: if M |= w O(B/A) and Z is such that Z ∩ ||A||∩ ||B|| =∅, then ||A→B|| ∈ ob(Z)
Proof. Suppose that M |= w O(B/A) and that Z is such that Z ∩||A||∩||B|| =∅, and let X = Z ∩||A||. Then X ⊆ ||A|| and X ∩ ||B|| =∅. Thus, from M |= w O(B/A), it follows that ||B|| ∈ ob(X). Thus, from condition (5b ) (see observation II-2-1), X∩||B|| ∈ob(X), i.e. Z∩||A||∩||B|| ∈ob(Z∩||A||). And, since Z∩||A||∩||B|| ⊆ Z∩||A||, Z∩||A||∩||B|| ∈ob(Z∩||A||) and Z∩||A|| ⊆ Z, from condition (5d), it follows that (Z-(Z∩||A||))∪(Z∩||A||∩||B||) ∈ob(Z).
And, from condition (5b ), this implies that (W-||A||))∪||B|| ∈ob(Z), i.e. ||A→B|| ∈ ob(Z).
Result II-3-2 The previous axiomatization is sound (i.e . all theorems are valid).
Proof.
(1) The proof that 2 is a normal modal operator of type S5 is standard (from its truth condition). Let X ⊆ ||A|| and X ∩ ||B∧C|| = ∅. Then X ⊆ ||A|| and X ∩ ||B|| = ∅, and, from M |= w O(B/A), it follows that ||B|| ∈ob(X). Analogously, we get that ||C|| ∈ob(X). And, since X∩||B||∩||C||= X∩||B∧C|| =∅, by (semantic) condition (5c), we get that ||B||∩||C|| = ||B∧C|| ∈ob(X). Thus M |= w O(B∧C/A).
(15) The validity of (O a -FD) and (O p -FD) follows simply from the relevant truth conditions.
And, taking into account result II-3-1, we can conclude that every theorem is valid (as we wish).
Lemma The proof of (O p -DD) is analogous. Induction step:
(ii) A=¬B and o(B). Thesis: o(A). Proof (using standard properties of the mc sets): (That is, we go through the list a 1 ,…,a n of all the subformulae of ϕ. We start by checking if ♦(a 1 ∧A)∈ . If it is, we take a 1 as the first conjunct A 1 of d; if not, we make A1 be ¬a 1 . And so on.) The proof that 'if is mc and ♦A∈ , then ♦(d∧A)∈ ' is then as follows:
Assume, by induction hypothesis, that (*) ♦(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧A)∈ . If ♦(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧a i ∧A)∈ , we are done. Suppose that ♦(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧a i ∧A) / ∈ . Since is mc and 2 is a normal operator, then ¬♦(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧a i ∧A)∈ and so, also (**) 2(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧A → ¬a i ) ∈ . And, from (*) and (**), it follows that ♦(A 1 ∧…∧A i−1 ∧¬a i ∧A)∈ (as we wish to prove).
Lemma II-5-3 Let be mc, d a descriptor and A∈bc( ) (i.e. A is any Boolean combination of subformulae of ϕ). Then if '♦(d∧A)∈ then 2(d→A)∈ ' (property designated by o(A) in the proof below).
